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cifically been addressed in the federal courts. But, after Shell, those
narrowing constructions may not be sufficient. Finally, the defendant
has a due process right to notice and opportunity to defend against
every aggravating factor and every narrowing construction on which
the Commonwealth intends to offer evidence.
Properly raising and preserving challenges to the application of
the vileness factors is even more critical after Shell. Please contact the

Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse for assistance on how to raise
and preserve this claim.
Summary and analysis by:
Ginger M. Jonas

PARKER V. DUGGER
111 S. Ct. 731 (1991)
United States Supreme Court

FACTS
A Florida jury convicted the petitioner Robert Parker of two first
degree drug related murders and recommended a life sentence for both
killings. The trial court judge accepted the jury's life recommendation for one murder but overrode its findings on the second and
sentenced Parker to death. In the latter crime, the judge found six
aggravating factors and no statutory mitigating factors, but did not
discuss non-statutory mitigating evidence. Under Florida law, if a
judge finds clear and convincing evidence that supports the death
sentence, and further determines that no reasonable person could
differ in this assessment, the judge may override the jury's life
recommendation and impose the death sentence. See Tedder v. State,
322 So.2d 908 (Fla. 1975).
On direct appeal, the Florida Supreme Court found that evidence
of the second murder did not support two of the six aggravating factors
found by the trial court judge. The reviewing court did not vacate the
death sentence because it determined that the trial court found no
mitigating factors to weigh against the four remaining, valid aggravating factors. In the penalty phase, defense counsel offered no mitigating
factors enumerated by the Florida death penalty statute, but did
present evidence that the defendant was under the influence of large
amounts of alcohol and drugs during the murders, that he suffered a
difficult childhood, that none of his accomplices received a death
sentence, and that defendant maintained a positive adult relationship
with his family and neighbors. The Florida Supreme Court did not
consider these non-statutory mitigating factors and affirmed the death
sentence.
HOLDING
The United States Supreme Court concluded that the trial court
judge found non-statutory mitigating factors. The Court based its
holding on the fact that the judge overrode the jury's sentencing
recommendation for only one of the two murders. Because the trial
court judge found five aggravating factors in the first killing and
accepted the life recommendation, the Court inferred that the judge
found non-statutory mitigating evidence. Considering that the nonstatutory mitigating evidence applied to both killings the Court further
held that the judge also weighed the non-statutory evidence for the
second killing, but found that evidence supporting the death sentence
was so clear and convincing that no reasonable juror could find
otherwise. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the defendant was
denied meaningful appellate review when the Florida Supreme Court
failed to acknowledge the availability of non-statutory mitigating
evidence. The Court remanded the case to the Florida Supreme Court
under the authority of Clemons v. Mississippi, 110 S. Ct. 1441 (1990),

which permits either appellate reweighing of aggravating and mitigating factors or harmless error analysis on the correct record.
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
Florida is a "weighing" state, whose statutory sentencing scheme
differs from that of Virginia. The Florida statute defines certain
aggravating and mitigating factors relevant to the imposition of the
death penalty. See Fla. Stat. §§ 921.141(5) and 921.141(6) (1985 and
Supp. 1990). The death penalty may be imposed only where sufficient
aggravating circumstances exist that outweigh mitigating circumstances. Fla. Stat. § 921.141(3) (1985). A jury makes the initial
sentencing recommendation to the judge and the judge imposes the
sentence. Fla. Stat. §§ 921.141(2) and 921.141(3). The jury considers
only those aggravating circumstances enumerated, but may weigh any
mitigating evidence.
The Virginia death penalty scheme requires the jury to consider
only the "vileness" and "future dangerousness" aggravating factors,
and further directs the jury to consider both statutory and nonstatutory mitigating factors. However, after reviewing aggravating
and mitigating evidence, the Virginia jury has the option of imposing
a life sentence even if it finds both aggravating factors. Therefore,
there is a strong argument that Virginia is a defacto "weighing" state
and meaningful appellate review must take that into account if one of
the two Virginia aggravating factors is found to be constitutionally
infirm. See case summary of Clemons v. Mississippi,Capital Defense
Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 8 (1989).
In any event, the importance of Parker v. Dugger does not depend on whether state review is in a "weighing" state. This case shows
that it is proper for a federal habeas court to monitor whether a state
court truly affords meaningful appellate review of a state sentencing
scheme. This is a different message than that sent by the Courtjust last
term in Lewis v. Jeffers, 111 S. Ct. 111 (1990). See case summary of
Lewis v. Jeffers, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1,p.7 (1990). In
Lewis, the Court assessed the application of an aggravating factor and
held that if any rational fact finder could have found the aggravating
factor, an irrational or inconsistent application by state courts was not
a federal concern. The Parker court went to great lengths to reconstruct the trial record in support of its conclusion that the state court
behaved arbitrarily. In doing so, the Court rejected the dissenters'
position that a state supreme court's findings were "mere errors of
state law."
Summary and analysis by:
Victor A. Lago

